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Abstract This paper addresses a key problem in EU-China economic relations: the
capacity of the EU to exert leverage through its economic diplomacy in the context of
key economic trends, policy dilemmas, and processes of governance. The paper begins
by identifying key elements of the EU’s economic diplomacy and their relationship to
key functions: deliberation, representation, communication, and negotiation. It con-
tinues by reviewing key trends and challenges in EU-China economic relations, in
terms of trade, finance/investment, and broader issues of economic performance, with
special reference to the problems emanating from the current economic turbulence both
in the EU and in the broader global political economy. It then identifies a number of key
policy dilemmas for the EU in areas such as trade defense/trade promotion, environ-
ment/development, security/commercial priorities, investment/sovereignty, and ex-
plores these in terms of three key concepts: orientation, coordination, and effectiveness.
In pursuing this analysis, the paper relates these trends and dilemmas to attempts to
govern EU-China economic relations: public/private, bilateral/multilateral, and regula-
tory/political. In the final section of the paper, these efforts are evaluated in the context
of the EU’s economic diplomacy, with relation to key actors, processes, and outcomes
and to the key functions of deliberation, representation, communication, and
negotiation.
Introduction
The EU’s “China problem” has become a major preoccupation of EU policy makers
during the past decade. Encompassing a large and politically sensitive deficit in
manufacturing trade, a growth in mutual investment relations, and the presence of
important environmental and human rights considerations, the problem is compounded
by differences in political cultures and institutions and by broader developments in the
global political economy. As such, it falls in some respects squarely into the broader
problem of the EU’s relations with “rising powers” and the problems encountered in
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framing consistent and effective responses to the challenges they pose (Smith 2013; see
also Breslin 2013).
In important respects, though, the “China problem” is distinctive (Casarini 2013).
The sheer scale of the commercial relationship, and the unevenness of the balance of
costs and benefits that it produces, are important elements in this distinctiveness. These
elements, in turn, give rise to significant commercial disputes involving both sectoral
and systemic components—that is to say, they involve material processes and interests,
but they also touch on the development and functioning of the global political economy
in the broader sense. Despite attempts to cast the EU-China relationship as a “compre-
hensive strategic partnership” (see for example the Conclusions of the September 2012
EU-China Summit, European Commission 2012), this tension between issue-based
disputes and broader principles of international economic behavior persists, and is at
the core of EU-China relations.
Alongside these key elements goes another—the focus of the relationship on what
can be termed economic diplomacy. There is a complex but asymmetric relationship of
interdependence between the EU and China, giving rise to planned and unplanned
linkages, and to differential perceptions of sensitivity and vulnerability (Smith and Xie
2009). In these conditions, the EU’s response is concentrated particularly in the area of
economic diplomacy. This is not peculiar to the EU—the Chinese government itself has
recently developed institutional devices to underpin a more coordinated and consistent
economic diplomacy, and to assist it in framing its trade strategies (China Daily 2012;
for background, see Wu 2007) But the EU, and before it, the European Communities,
have a long tradition of economic diplomacy, and arguably economic diplomacy is still
the key attribute of the EU as an international actor.
What is economic diplomacy? A basic definition might see it as the economic
expression of the central elements of diplomacy in general: of deliberation, represen-
tation, communication, and negotiation. Beyond this, there might be two further
dimensions to the phenomenon: the first would see economic diplomacy as the pursuit
of diplomacy with economic weapons, for example through economic sanctions, while
the second would present it as diplomacy centering on economic issues, and thus
defined by its concern with the management of trade, investment, and other commercial
relationships. While the first of these dimensions is clearly significant to the develop-
ment of EU diplomacy in general, the concern in this article is largely with the second:
that is to say, with economic diplomacy as a response to the demands of the EU-China
economic relationship and as a means of structuring and managing that relationship.
The key question the article is trying to explore is thus: how has the EU developed its
economic diplomacy in response to the economic and commercial challenges faced in
EU-China relations, how effective has that diplomacy been, and how does it reflect the
EU’s broader development as a diplomatic actor in a globalizing world?
The article begins by identifying key elements of the EU’s economic diplomacy and
their relationship to key functions: deliberation, representation, communication, and
negotiation. It continues by reviewing key trends and challenges in EU-China econom-
ic relations, in terms of trade, finance/investment, and broader issues of economic
performance, with special reference to the problems emanating from the current
economic turbulence both in the EU and in the broader global political economy. It
then identifies a number of key policy dilemmas for the EU in areas such as trade
defense/trade promotion, environment/development, security/commercial priorities,
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investment/sovereignty, and analyzes them in terms of three key concepts: orientation,
coordination, and effectiveness. In pursuing this analysis, the paper relates these trends
and dilemmas to attempts to govern EU-China economic relations: public/private,
bilateral/multilateral, and regulatory/political. In the final section of the paper, these
efforts are evaluated in the context of the EU’s economic diplomacy, with relation to
key actors, processes, and outcomes and to the key functions of deliberation, represen-
tation, communication, and negotiation.
The EU and economic diplomacy
As noted above, the EU has a long history of economic diplomacy. Indeed, for many
purposes, economic diplomacy has constituted the major external expression of the
EU’s weight in the global arena (Smith 1998, 2001). The essential underpinnings of this
claim are two: first, that from the outset the European Communities embodied a
commitment to the integration of external commercial policy, and second, the internal
development of the European economic integration project gave the material founda-
tion for the exercise of economic influence in the outside world. Central to this
influence from the start was the Common Commercial Policy, which over more than
50 years of the project, has expanded to encompass not only trade in goods but also
trade in services, intellectual property issues, and a range of other central regulatory
functions (Meunier and Nicolaidis 2011; Young 2002; Young and Peterson 2006; see
also Damro 2012). Alongside this policy foundation are a variety of other external
policies relying explicitly or implicitly on the EU’s economic weight in the global
arena: development policy, environmental policy, transport policy, some aspects of
energy policy, and so on (Smith 2007). So, the external policy activities of the EU are,
in many respects, dominated by economic considerations and by the use of economic
instruments in a broad sense.
From the outset also, the institutional framework for the conduct of the European
project’s external policies has been dominated by the focus on external economic
relations. The Common Commercial Policy, as noted above, has expanded its reach,
but is still centered in Directorate General (DG) Trade within the European
Commission (and not significantly within the European External Action Service
established in the wake of the Lisbon Treaty). The use of economic instruments such
as development assistance, economic sanctions, or commercial agreements, has ex-
panded to constitute a sophisticated armory of inducements and potential punishments
for external partners or “targets.” Although the Lisbon Treaty promised the merging of
all of the EU’s external policies and instruments into a more general framework for
“external action,” in many respects, this has not (yet) been achieved and economic
diplomacy remains a distinct and distinctive area within the institutional architecture,
buttressed in this status by specificities of culture and practice that resist treaty change
and reform. This is not to say that the structures of economic diplomacy have not
changed: rather it is to note that they retain a very distinct position within the EU’s
international personality and “actorness,” and that this is the key to an understanding of
EU-China economic relations.
If we can argue that there remains a very distinct EU system of economic diplomacy,
what then can we say about its operating principles? Steven Woolcock, in a recent
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extended study of the area, has identified three core elements as constituting economic
diplomacy within the Union: decision making, negotiation, and policy effectiveness
(Woolcock 2012; see also Bayne and Woolcock 2011 for a more general discussion of
the “new” economic diplomacy). The first two of these are descriptors of EU activity
and the framing and implementation of policy; the latter is at least in part an evaluative
category that enables the analyst to arrive at some judgments on the impact of EU
policies and the extent to which they match up to the claims made for them. The
implicit argument is that the quality of decision making and of negotiation in and by the
EU is central to the establishment of policy effectiveness. Woolcock goes on to apply
this model to a range of EU policy domains and to identify key variations in the
effectiveness of EU activity.
Woolcock’s framework, though, actually invites the analyst to go further and to ask a
number of key questions about why and how decision making, negotiation, and the
pursuit of policy effectiveness take place. One key area in which it can be pushed
further is that of the framing of economic diplomacy. At one level, this is a matter of
procedures. It entails the provision of an institutional framework, of key resources
(human and non-human), of coordination mechanisms, and of implementation path-
ways. But each of these procedures is subject to contestation within the EU. The
institutional framework produces tensions despite (or perhaps because of?) the
Lisbon settlement, between the “economic” imperatives of Commission-centered bod-
ies and the “political” priorities of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and
others. Resources, especially during a period of austerity throughout the Union, are
scarce and subject to fierce disputes, not only within the Brussels framework but also
between Brussels and member states. Coordination, as a result, can be less a matter of
procedure than one of political contestation and “turf wars.” And finally, implementa-
tion, whether or not agreed upon and coordinated within the EU, has to take place in a
turbulent world in which a number of “great powers,” including China, may not be
amenable to EU influence and in which the growth of transnational networks may
simply make solutions inaccessible to economic diplomacy of a conventional type.
Alongside this set of material constraints goes another—the problems of under-
standing, trust, and responsiveness that ultimately condition the impact and effective-
ness of economic diplomacy. Very often, of course, these issues intersect with those
more material constraints outlined above—where they do, they can reinforce or
undermine the effectiveness of the diplomatic process. Rather than a set of procedures,
diplomacy here can be conceived of as a set of social processes. The five elements that
seem to be central are those of deliberation, representation, communication, negotia-
tion, and feedback/adjustment or learning. In the first place, economic diplomacy is a
process of deliberation in which alternative views of the “problem” are aired and in
which a variety of actors within the EU are engaged; it is not simply a technocratic
process of identifying the relevant regulations or procedures and then applying them. It
involves domestic politics, as well as the politics of the EU as a whole. And it concerns
the culture of decision making as well as its material aspects. In the same way, the
process of representation could simply be a question of “our man/woman in Geneva (or
Beijing),” but it actually raises important questions about how and by whom the EU is
represented to the outside world. Communication is not simply a procedural matter: it
concerns the framing of issues and messages that are then subject to mediation,
interpretation, and transformation by the channels through which they are presented
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or by the “target.” Negotiation must be seen not simply as a technical process but also
as a process of mutual learning, the shaping of expectations, and the generation of trust
(or of course, mistrust) on the part of those involved; and in the EU, of course,
negotiation goes on within the Brussels institutions or between them and the Member
States as well as between Brussels and the outside world. Finally, processes of
feedback, adjustment, and learning are partly built formally into the EU architecture
(in the shape of policy evaluation and “lessons learned” procedures), but equally
significant may be the less formal processes of social learning that are undergone by
the participants in diplomatic processes such as those that take place around the World
Trade Organization (WTO) in Geneva, or in target countries between EU delegations
and the host country policy community.
What this means is that the EU’s economic diplomacy is surrounded by a host of
formal and less formal shaping forces. The institutional architecture and formal proce-
dures are important but so too are less formal but equally powerful social forces. Nor
must one forget the force of history: the EU’s economic diplomacy has a 50-year “back
story” and this is a key shaping factor for those who see themselves as the heirs to this
legacy. At the same time, the impact of current policy preoccupations and of broader
social and economic forces must be taken into account—especially, in current circum-
stances, the impact of financial and broader economic crisis in the EU, which puts it
into a distinctive position among the world’s economic “great powers.” If the EU is a
“power” in this context, it is a unique one: a hybrid actor, in which not only the
Brussels institutions matter but also do the Member States, who have a persistent and
even growing role. The Lisbon Treaty was aimed at resolving some of these contra-
dictions, but in many ways, it has failed to do so—partly due to the accumulated
historical legacy referred to above (Smith 2012).
As a result, the EU’s economic diplomacy is more a space of contestation than a
settled set of procedures. And this matters when we come to consider the EU’s
economic diplomacy towards China, because in dealing with a dynamic and potent
economic challenger, one would expect that the fault lines and tensions within the EU’s
system of economic diplomacy might come to the fore. The next section of the paper
will address, in more detail, the nature of the challenges posed by EU-China relations.
The challenge of EU-China relations
As noted at the beginning of the paper, EU-China relations encapsulate some of the key
challenges facing the EU in its economic diplomacy, and in a concentrated form. Other
relationships, such as that with the USA, may be more comprehensive and longer-
established, yet the dynamism and trajectory of EU-China relations are a compelling
fact of the EU’s external environment. But what are the key components of this
challenge and how do they add up to a test of the EU’s capacity for economic
diplomacy? In this section, I identify four key elements, and show how they feed into
a general challenge.
The first element is what might broadly be termed as “institutional factors.” The
system of relations that has grown up between the EU and China has become
increasingly dense and institutionalized, at a number of intersecting levels. This
phenomenon of multi-level interactions and institutions has been noted by a number
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of commentators on the relationship (for example Algieri 2002, 2008; Smith and Xie
2011), and it extends from the regular (at least in principle) summits between EU and
Chinese leaders, through high-level dialogues of which the most relevant here is the
High-Level Economic and Trade Dialogue, to a wide range of sectoral dialogues,
working groups, and networks composed not only of government and EU representa-
tives but also of independent experts and industry representatives. There is thus a set of
what might be called “peak organizations” framing EU-China economic diplomacy, but
these are increasingly surrounded by an infrastructure of specialized economic and
commercial bodies dealing with a wide range of regulatory and other issues on a
continuous basis. Alongside this EU-China institutional structure, it is important that
the Member States of the EU retain active economic policies towards China, and that
they are capable not only of forming independent strategies expressing their specific
preferences, but also of pursuing these through a variety of mechanisms (Fox and
Godement 2009; see also Ross et al. 2010, Part 2). It is significant that although EU-
China relations can be and are described as a form of “strategic partnership,” a similar
label can be and has been applied to relations between a number of key Member States
and Beijing. Finally, as touched upon above, alongside the Brussels institutions and
national governments, there is an expanding range of networks and specialized rela-
tionships that effectively constitute a form of “private governance” in EU-China
relations. These three sets of relations—Brussels-Beijing, Member States-Beijing and
private networks—are interrelated, but they are not always complementary and they
can provide evidence of the fragmentation of the institutional framework for EU
economic diplomacy.
A second set of factors that must be considered when evaluating the challenge to EU
economic diplomacy posed by EU-China relations is what might be termed “material
factors.” By this, I mean substantive dimensions of policy that generate real clashes of
interest and thus require the attention of policy makers on both sides of the relationship.
The most obvious of these is trade, and specifically, the rapidly growing but unbalanced
trade between the EU and China (which here is taken to encompass trade in goods and
services, and trade-related aspects of intellectual property). There is no need here to
reiterate the arguments that have been made about the composition and impact of this
trade problem, but it should be noted that they cut across all three of the institutional
dimensions noted above—Brussels-Beijing, Member States-Beijing, and private net-
works. They generate complex and often mismatched sets of preferences which can
lead to the fragmentation or the paralysis of EU policy making, and thus are key
constraining factors in the practice of EU economic diplomacy. In particular, they have
led to problems in concluding key economic agreements as part of a broader “strategic
partnership” (Holslag 2013). I will explore these issues further below, but the key point
here is the cross-cutting nature of the impacts of the trade imbalance.
Trade, though, is not the only area in which the dynamics of the EU-China
relationship can pose a severe challenge to EU economic diplomacy. The Lisbon
Treaty extended the Union’s competence in external commercial issues to cover
investment relations, and thus created a new potential set of pressures for the
Brussels institutions. It is fair to say that the implications of this extension of compe-
tence are still being worked out, but they have led to calls for a new investment treaty
between Brussels and Beijing, to replace, in principle, the vast range of bilateral
agreements between China and EU Member States. Not for nothing has Sophie
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Meunier argued that this produces a situation in which “divide and rule” can be
practiced by Beijing, almost without it being a conscious strategic choice (Meunier
2013; see also Parello-Plesner 2013, and for a positive interpretation, Jiang 2013).
Beyond investment, there is a series of areas that might be given the umbrella label of
macro-economic management and that constitute a major contextual factor for EU
economic diplomacy—especially, it might be argued, in the current situation of eco-
nomic and financial crisis within the Euro-zone. Both investment and macro-economic
management are accompanied on the agenda of material factors by issues such as
environmental policy and energy policy, both areas in which the EU has a good cause
to want something from the Chinese, but both areas in which the Chinese have very
definite material interests of their own (Lee 2013). All of the areas outlined above are
also linked to a core EU concern with competitiveness, which has found direct
expression in external EU trade strategy under the umbrella of the Global Europe
program adopted in 2006 and since revised.
The EU-China relationship thus focuses in a concentrated way on a number of
important material considerations. But at the same time, it is inseparable from problems
noted earlier, which might be summarized as cognitive factors—those of trust, respon-
siveness, and learning. For economic diplomacy, these are key considerations, since
they penetrate to the core of the processes of communication and negotiation and thus
also into areas of policy implementation. Although they are less tangible than the
material factors dealt with above, they can be crucial in conditioning the perceptions,
expectations, and understandings that are derived from EU-China interactions. It has
been noted on many occasions that there is a cultural divide between the EU and China,
and that from an EU perspective, this plays into the problem of introspection—that is to
say, into the tendency within European institutions to define problems in terms of EU
needs and institutional formula rather than on the basis of a deep understanding of the
target country or region (Smith and Vichitsorasatra 2007). Despite EU efforts to
generate programs designed to train and develop expertise relevant to EU-Asian and
particularly, EU-China relations, the jury is out on the effectiveness of European
attempts to raise levels of cultural awareness and sensitivity. This is important not least
because of the chain of communication between Brussels and EU delegations which
carry out the day to day economic diplomacy that is core to EU-China relations. That
chain of communication has been disrupted since the Treaty of Lisbon by the handing
of responsibility for these delegations to the EEAS—even where they remain staffed
predominantly by those with a deep background in the Commission and specifically,
DG Trade. So, it is not surprising that one of the problems faced by EU economic
diplomacy is that of framing appropriate understandings and expectations of Chinese
behavior and of the ways in which European behavior is received and responded to by
Beijing.
A final set of forces operating to condition EU-China economic diplomacy is that of
the broader global political economy, and of what might broadly be termed environ-
mental turbulence. There is no need to describe in detail the key features of the
turbulence that has threatened to destabilize both the system as a whole, and individual
national economies during the past 5 years. But it is important to recognize that some of
these destabilizing features were present before the financial crashes of 2007 and 2008,
and that they are closely linked with the general impact of globalization. The effects of
these forces are multiple, but for the purposes of the argument here, it is possible to
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identify four in particular. First, there has been severe pressure on the global institu-
tional frameworks for economic diplomacy, and thus on the contexts within which large
parts of EU-China relations are conducted. Second, and related, there has been enor-
mous pressure on the rules of international economic diplomacy, and the rules around
which diplomatic activity is centered—in other words, the global regulatory and
governance structures that are the subject of almost continuous negotiation, and which
shape the standards of appropriate behavior for actors within the global political
economy. Third, the rise of new economic powers has meant an often wrenching series
of changes and perceptions of asymmetry within the global political economy, affecting
everything from patterns of trade in natural resources to the perceived advantages and
disadvantages of protectionism or privileged partnerships between both old and new
powers. Finally, there has been an increasing apparent mismatch between notions of
“sovereign” and “post-sovereign” strategies in the global political economy, and thus
between the kinds of norms assumed or appropriated by bodies such as the EU and
those espoused by new, emerging, or re-emerging economic powers (Smith 2013). In
the specific case of China, as recently argued by David Shambaugh, the nature—scope
and depth—of its power may be contestable in some respects, but its impacts on
perceptions in a turbulent global arena have been extensive (Shambaugh 2013).
All of this adds up to a set of major and often severe pressures on the practices of
economic diplomacy in general—and these pressures are concentrated by the changing
pattern of EU-China relations. The stakes are high for both parties, since while the EU
both needs and is apprehensive about China, the Chinese equally need a robust and
open Europe into which to project their exports and—increasingly—their investments
(see for example Erixon 2012; Westad 2012). The implications for economic diploma-
cy are not only tangible and material, but also intangible and linked to key understand-
ings about the nature of the global political economy and the EU’s place within it. That
place is challenged by the more general crisis around the Brussels institutions and the
EU’s standing as an economic “superpower;” it is also linked strongly to the role of
other economic powers, and specifically, the USA, which is not only the EU’s longest
standing strategic partner but also a key competitor in relations with the Asia-Pacific
and with China itself (Pawlak 2012). The result is a series of dilemmas for EU
economic diplomacy, which will be explored in the following section of the paper.
Dilemmas of EU economic diplomacy
Thus far, the paper has identified the key aspects of economic diplomacy, specifically
with relation to the EU, and outlined some of the key issues affecting the EU’s
economic diplomacy that have arisen in EU-China relations. In this section, I argue
that the issues previously described give rise to a series of dilemmas for the EU, which
reflect and affect its capacity to practice effective economic diplomacy towards China.
These dilemmas fall into three main areas: dilemmas of diplomatic orientation, di-
lemmas of diplomatic coordination and focus, and dilemmas of diplomatic effective-
ness and impact.
First, the EU faces a number of dilemmas of diplomatic orientation when dealing
with China. One of the central dilemmas in this area is one that has dogged EU
economic diplomacy from the outset: the tension between the pursuit of trade defense
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and that of trade promotion. As has been noted by a number of studies, EU external
commercial policy has been characterized by enduring tensions between Member
States whose priorities lie either in the defense of EU economic interests against
external threats or the pursuit of an open trading system in which the EU can gain
from market opening on a multilateral basis (Woolcock 2012; Smith and Woolcock
1999; Smith 2001). This is sometimes characterized as a north–south divide among the
Member States, with those in the north prepared to pursue trade liberalization almost
whatever the cost and those in the south much more prone to bouts of protectionism.
The case of China opens up this debate in a very direct way, especially given the
differential vulnerabilities of EU Member States to the “Chinese threat” as exemplified
in the textiles dispute of 2005 and after (Smith and Xie 2009). But this is not the only
dimension to the problem: there is also a key area of tension between producers and
consumers that runs across national or regional boundaries, and which sees retailers at
odds with producer organizations on a European scale. One thing is clear: this dilemma
has been exacerbated by the impact of the financial crisis in the EU, which has given
rise to renewed fears of protectionism. Such fears are a potent shaping force for EU
economic diplomacy, and the contradictions to which they can give rise were particu-
larly apparent in the EU-China trade dispute relating to solar panels in mid-2013. This
created severe cleavages on both the Member State and the producer/consumer dimen-
sion, and threatened collateral damage to transatlantic trade relations (see for example
(Carnegy et al. 2013; Bradsher and Eddy 2013)).
Another dilemma of orientation that is raised by EU-China relations relates to the
tension between environment and development (or recovery) as potential priorities for
EU economic diplomacy. This again is a tension that runs through large areas of the
EU’s external economic relations: is the emphasis in relations with key commercial
partners to be placed on modernization and growth (and thus on EU access to growing
markets), or is it to be placed on environmental sustainability? Since environmental
sustainability is a key normative commitment of the EU, reflecting both internal policy
and issues of European identity, it is not surprising that this has raised important
questions for economic diplomacy. In the case of EU-China relations, it is accompanied
by the feeling that China’s rapid economic growth has been bought at the expense of
environmental quality, for example, through the use of coal for power generation, and
this, in turn, puts additional pressure on negotiators in a variety of arenas (Lee 2013).
There is evidence, though, that the Chinese themselves have grasped the potential for
economic advantage that lies in the active pursuit of environmental sustainability, and
thus, that the EU, whose own attempts to establish viable emissions trading schemes
and other environmental programs have seen patchy success, might be outflanked in
this area.
A third key dilemma of orientation experienced by EU economic diplomacy is that
caused by the tension between commercial and “political” objectives. This is not
simply a general contextual factor for EU economic diplomacy in relation to China;
it also penetrates to the core of the institutional tensions mentioned earlier. The priority
of DG Trade in the European Commission is just that—trade, preferably untainted by
security, humanitarian, or other more directly political considerations. The institution-
alization of the differences between the trade policy community and the more political
aspects of diplomacy that was noted earlier plays directly into the resulting problems of
prioritization, and the relationship between the EU and China focuses this dilemma
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very strongly. To take only two examples: the increasing Chinese activity in sub-
Saharan Africa is part of a broader trend towards the securitization of development
policies, and also plays into concerns about access to raw materials on the part of the
EU, while the linkages between human rights issues and trade with China remain
powerful, specifically in relation to the status of Tibet or the position of national
minorities in certain parts of the country.
A final dilemma of orientation for EU economic diplomacy is the tension between
the need for Chinese investment in a number of EU countries and the desire to maintain
sovereignty in the light of financial crisis. As Sophie Meunier has pointed out, the rapid
growth of Chinese investment in the EU—albeit from a low level—has taken place at a
time when competence for investment, as part of external commercial relations, has
been acquired by the Union via the Lisbon Treaty, but when there are also powerful
national positions and national differences among EU Member States on such issues
(Meunier 2013). The dilemma expresses itself in different national practices and
different degrees of openness to Chinese investment, and potentially at least lays the
EU open to explicit or implicit “divide and rule” tactics on the part of the Chinese. In
such a situation, the problem for those pursuing an investment treaty between the EU
and China is that there is no obvious incentive for the Chinese to negotiate or to accept
the standards encapsulated in EU negotiating positions. But this is symptomatic of a
broader range of tensions over the appropriate aims and framing of EU economic
diplomacy.
The second type of dilemma that can be examined here is dilemmas of diplomatic
coordination and focus. It was noted earlier that EU-China relations were carried on at
several different and intersecting levels and in a number of linked policy domains. To
put it concisely, EU-China relations are simultaneously bilateral, bi-multilateral, inter-
regional, and multilateral, and these different levels carry with them often markedly
different sets of incentives, communication patterns, and issues of coordination. Two
such issues stand out. The first is that of linkage: the mass of linkages between different
levels and different issue areas means that EU economic diplomacy has to take account
of the potential externalities from each level in relation to others, and this can produce
“gaps” and potentially, costly failures. Because the relationship with China is rapidly
developing and broad in scope, it carries with it a very wide range of such linkages and
potential costs. Thus, for example, the attempt to use the EU’s emissions trading
scheme as an instrument of international economic diplomacy in recent years was
foiled on the one hand by the problems of emissions trading within the EU itself, but on
the other by the rallying of a wide-ranging coalition of opponents, including both the
USA and China (Men 2012).
This points to another problem of economic diplomacy: the need for coalition
building and coalition management. In situations of complex interdependence, the
capacity to forge and maintain coalitions in relation to key issue areas is a central part
of diplomatic strategy. One of the most obvious areas in which the EU has attempted
such coalition building is that of environmental regulation, and in particular climate
change. But it is also one of the most prominent areas of fluctuation in the EU’s
capacity to sustain meaningful coalitions. The Copenhagen climate change summit of
December 2009 was perhaps the low point of this process for the EU—having
approached the summit confident in its ability to build and maintain a coalition favoring
a successor to the Kyoto Protocol, it was confronted by opposing coalitions that
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rejected its approach and proposed alternatives (Vogler 2011). One of the key coalitions
in this case was that between the USA and China—two of the EU’s most significant
“strategic partners.” Although the situation has been improved since Copenhagen, not
least by changed positions on the part of Beijing and a more modest approach on the
part of the EU, the potential for such coalition politics remains substantial as a
successor to Kyoto is sought over the period up to 2015.
Coordination in economic diplomacy thus raises key issues for EU-China relations.
Both these issues and those relating to dilemmas of orientation feed into the third set of
dilemmas to be examined here: dilemmas of effectiveness and impact. Much of the
attention paid to EU diplomacy recently has been focused on processes and on
outputs—in other words, the working of the post-Lisbon institutional framework and
the capacity of the EU to act (subject of course to the problems of orientation and
coordination discussed above). While this is important, and a natural focus during the
embedding in of the new structures, it deflects attention from a simple question: what
difference does EU economic diplomacy make? One way of addressing this question in
the context of EU-China relations is to examine the stated aims of EU policies, and then
compare them with the outcomes. One of the most clearly and frequently stated aims of
EU economic diplomacy in relation to China has been the incorporation of that country
into the multilateral trading system, and the exercise of multilateral disciplines on
Beijing in the global political economy. In this, it can be said that the EU has been
successful at the macro level, since the Chinese have become members of the WTO and
are engaged in a number of other key multilateral frameworks such as that provided by
the G20. But of course, the EU has not been the only force engaged in the attempt to
bring China into the multilateral framework; the USA has been a persistent influence
and its desire to make China a “responsible stakeholder” in global governance of trade
and associated areas has been stated decisively not only by the White House but also
(and sometimes in a more partisan way) by Congress.
Despite this apparent success at the broadest multilateral level, the EU has found it
more difficult to contain or manage the Chinese as the policy issues become more
specific and the need for negotiation more immediate. The EU does have weapons to
deploy, in the shape of its trade defense and trade promotion instruments, but these
have not always proved to be effective. One reason for this is the fragmentation of
interests within the EU, as noted above—diplomacy is difficult to conduct where there
are conflicting perceptions of the interests that are being pursued, and in some cases,
the active pursuit of national economic diplomacies alongside the EU’s activities. Thus,
the economic diplomacies pursued by France, Germany, and the UK towards Beijing
may or may not support the efforts made through the Brussels machinery; where that
machinery itself is subject to questioning and contention, as in the case of investment,
then negotiation and communication are unlikely to be very effective.
Another reason for the relative ineffectiveness of EU economic diplomacy in EU-
China relations is the extent to which it implicitly or explicitly calls for the restructuring
of domestic institutions and policy processes in China itself. It is here that one becomes
very conscious of the limits of economic diplomacy, since many of the policies and
norms espoused by the EU imply significant structural change—for example, in
environmental policy, investment rules or employment law—which is unlikely to be
readily forthcoming from Beijing. Such situations are not really susceptible to diplo-
macy, and the tendency in the EU to call for structural changes is unlikely to be
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successful in the short or medium terms. This said, it is apparent that the “softer”
versions of EU intrusion into Chinese domestic policies, for example through sectoral
working groups or networks, can have a more far-reaching effect on business practices
in China, and that these may feed back into change at the regional or national level.
The picture presented in this section is thus one of tensions and sometimes contra-
dictions. The three types of dilemma set out here are not unique to EU-China rela-
tions—indeed, they could be said to lie at the heart of all economic diplomacy in a
globalizing world—but they are focused in specific and significant ways by those
relations. Dilemmas of orientation are given added point by the rapid change charac-
teristic of the relationship and by the need to adapt and adjust in light of a dynamic set
of challenges. Dilemmas of coordination are especially taxing in a situation of increas-
ingly complex interdependence, where there are extensive linkages between issues and
arenas. Dilemmas of impact and effectiveness can be felt particularly sharply where
there are important structural, cultural, and attitudinal differences between negotiating
partners and where the balance of power between them is rapidly changing. Each of
these types of dilemma provides us with a way of penetrating the multi-layered and
multidimensional EU-China relationship, and evaluating the extent to which the EU has
managed to overcome the problems with which it is faced.
Conclusions: the limits of EU economic diplomacy
A significant treatment of the EU’s role in the global political economy has defined the
Union as a “conflicted trade power” (Meunier and Nicolaidis 2006), and the treatment
in this article seems to bear out that definition. If we take EU economic diplomacy as
entailing deliberation, representation, communication, negotiation, and feedback/learn-
ing, as discussed at the beginning of this article, we can see that:
& Deliberation is subject to a wide range of institutional and other fragmenting forces,
and in the case of China, these are especially salient, because of the uneven impact
of the “China problem” on different groups within the EU.
& Representation is a matter of internal negotiation as well as external competence,
and the EU can be “represented” in many different ways depending on issues and
arenas; tensions between different forms of representation and different types of
representatives are built into the system.
& Communication is a source of challenges, given the multiple channels that exist
between the EU and China, and the need to coordinate the messages transmitted
through these channels. The existence of several layers of representation and
channels of communication can be seen as a potentially disabling factor in the
pursuit of effective EU economic diplomacy.
& Negotiation is complicated by the fact that it takes place on a number of interrelated
‘tables’ and via a number of different types of representative. The major interna-
tional agreement between the EU and China remains the 1985 Trade and
Cooperation Agreement, and this situation reflects both the lack of desire in
China to enter into new and potentially politicized commitments and the inability
of the EU to put together a comprehensive negotiation package. In default of a
comprehensive agreement of the type reflected in the proposed Partnership and
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Cooperation Agreement, economic diplomacy conducted through the Commission
and with the use of “European” trade defense and trade promotion instruments
remains the dominant mode of negotiation.
& Finally, feedback, learning, and adjustment processes in EU economic diplomacy
are obscured by a number of factors: the multidimensional nature of the EU-China
relationship, the inter-institutional tensions that are often close to the surface in
Brussels, and the difficulties of orientation, coordination, and effectiveness as
pointed out in this paper. The EU may or may not be a “learning organization”—
but it is undeniable that one of its problems is that learning takes place in different
ways in different parts of the Brussels machinery, and that it is difficult to
coordinate the ways in which feedback is evaluated and acted upon.
One of the results of these contending forces is that the aims of EU economic
diplomacy as pursued towards China are both multiple and often in conflict. A
summary of major EU aims might include the following: defense or promotion of
EU economic interests; the promotion of EU actorness and legitimacy; the containment
of “rising powers” in the global political economy; contributing to global and regional
economic governance; linking to political and security interests; promoting EU norms
as the basis for restructuring of the global political economy and specific national
economies. The problem is that these aims have to be pursued in respect to EU-China
relations within a rapidly changing context, in which the EU has been enfeebled by
economic crisis, and in which global or regional structures are increasingly contested.
What this means is that the limits of EU economic diplomacy are tested by EU-China
relations in at least two ways: first, by the fluidity of the boundaries between economic
diplomacy and other aspects of the EU’s external activities; and second, by the forces
shaping the capacity of the EU to make a difference through economic diplomacy. The
warnings from Beijing in early June 2013 that the EU needed to recognize the limits
imposed by its declining power when pursuing its economic diplomacy (Hille 2013)
came as a timely reminder that the EU may be a market and trade superpower but one
suffering major internal and external constraints.
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